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ABSTRACT
Facebook has been a host to many different attack vectors, such as malicious apps that 
use their permissions to spread malware and compromise user accounts to spam inboxes 
and walls. We have discovered another method of launching attacks that is sneakier and less 
intrusive - Facebook pages. Facebook pages largely draw users by promising interesting 
features or downloads; they do not require their audience to provide anything in return, 
and they use their large followings to distribute and promote malware. Facebook pages 
are easy to create, are not verified for safety/authenticity, and need no permissions. 
They vastly outnumber Facebook applications, and collude in a less obvious way.
This work attempts to establish the legitimate nature of this attack channel as a cause 
for concern and determine a method to expose the vectors. We propose MAFIA - Malicious 
Facebook Page Identification, which uses machine learning and careful system analysis 
to determine which Facebook pages are likely to distribute malware. Due to the nature of 
their deception, we find some mention worthy features and trends, and see that a significant 
number of users are exposed to these threats on a daily basis.
We propose using the Page-friend graphs to gain further insight into the nature of 
Page relationships shown by benign vs malicious pages. Since Facebook pages have a 
different set of restrictions (unlike Twitter or LinkedIn) regarding friend-relationships, 
we utilize the reciprocal-edge graph between pages and their posting information with 
decision-tree based variants to accurately determine what features contribute the most to
ii
the identification of malicious pages in the Facebook ecosystem. Initial implementation
and results reflect on the efficacy of our system.
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1 INTRODUCTION
What started with classmates.com, AOL and Friendster has now become the sensa-
tion we know as the online social network, and it’s current vanguard is Facebook, Twitter,
and LinkedIn. These have evolved from purely informational tools to know the where-
abouts of former friends and acquaintances, to all-encompassing platforms that are used
for entertainment, event organization, discussion, and information dissemination.
In 2006, Symantec produced a report with hints that hackers were turning to online
social networks as a viable medium for distributing malware. Jagatic et. al harvested
publicly-available information from Facebook and used it for email-based attacks. It was
found that pretending to be a friend of the sender made phishing attacks significantly more
successful in terms of click-through rate. In 2007, Brown et. al did a study of context-
aware email spam based on profile information that is unrestricted to the general public,
using automated html parsing.
Vern Paxson et. al identified Facebook and Twitter spam using a series of honeypots
in 2010[6]. They identified several types of spammers based on posting frequency, how
they selected the people on their list, andmessage similarity features. This work was before
facebook had detailed categories of data visibility based on the level of closeness of the
observer (acquaintance, friend, family, etc.). The Koobface botnet largely relied on social
networks to spread its binaries, using a different one for each site and mainly using social
engineering.
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Thus, in the larger scale of OSNs, many channels of attack have presented them-
selves, and we find ourselves with a unique dilemma for Facebook. Users have an account
that represents their identity or footprint on these website, and a page to themselves where
they can present information about themselves. The level of information they choose to
share with friends, the general public, and any applications they choose to use is deter-
mined by the user, in the form of permissions and access lists. Several years ago, when
applications used to be more prominent, Facebook permissions were a lot less granular,
and allowed accesss to the user’s personal inbox, friend list, posting on their wall, etc.
An earlier study that exposed the presence of a large number of applications using their
permissions to generate spam and compromise user security resulted in a crackdown from
Facebook. These have made it significantly more difficult to generate any applications
with ill intent, since Facebook users now have the right to refuse any requested permis-
sion, and a denied permission is only repealed by Facebook after manual inspection by
multiple staff members.
While this has significantly stifled malicious applications, facebook pages on the
other hand continue to run amok because they operate completely independent of this sys-
tem. Pages are followed by interested users, and require no permissions - they become
popular mainly because the subject on which the page is based is of interest to a particular
fan base. There are 6 main categories for pages (Public Figure, Place, Brand, Entertain-
ment, Community, Organization) each of which has around 25 sub categories. Users Like
a page to show their interest in its content, and promote it of their own free will. Unlike
2
user friendlists(which are restricted to 5000 friends), a fan page can have any number of
people who subscribe to its content. Combined with the fact that people often share posts
by these pages of their own volition, we have a potentially dangerous mixture that could
easily see a large spread of malware.
In this work, we attempt to address the problem of pages spreading malicious data
by identifying a unique feature set. We then present a comparison with existing works to
show that our feature set is superior to past research and leverage graph features to identify
trends in malicious pages and their neighbor networks.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows - Chapter 2 contains a thorough explana-
tion of the ecosystem followed by an in-depth analysis of the related works and background
information in Chapter 3. We present the design and implementation of our system inChap-
ter 4, and evaluate our results in Chapter 5. Limitations and future work are recognized in
Chapter 6.
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2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
2.1 Facebook Ecosystem - A Primer
In this section, we provide an introduction to the Facebook OSN to provide context
for the reader regarding the rest of the thesis.
Users, Feeds, and Walls
Logging into Facebook.comwe see that each user has a news feed where information
pops up - this is the default home page and shows information from pages followed, apps
liked, users followed or friended, and groups or communities they are a member of.
Buttons on the top bar allow users to easily shift between their homescreens. One
such screen shows the user’s wall, which is where personalized posts can be made by
friends. Formerly, there was a permission that allowed facebook applications to post on
user’s walls but this was removed after an overhaul in permission granularity with an up-
grade in facebook’s graph API.
Facebook Graph API
The Graph API is the primary way of submitting and retrieving data from the face-
book platform. It is an HTTP API that can be used to query for data, submit stories, and a
variety of other tasks - with the help of an access token and an unique number represent-
ing the app/page/user, called their ID. These IDs are usually between 9 and 16 digits long
and are assigned at random(or at least in a pseudo random manner unknown to outside
4
research).
Facebook formerly used a RESTful API which is now deprecated, and has com-
pletely shifted to the Graph API, which is upgraded fairly often with major changes to the
structure and access criteria. Most applications were built on v1.0 of the API and were lost
once backward compatibility was removed for any apps that hadn’t upgraded to at least
v2.3 (as of this date). The latest version is now v2.7 and support for v2.(x) is provided up
to two years from the release of v2.(x+1).
Versions of the API determine the structure of the ’tree’ that determines access order
for different edges and fields for a node of any kind (app/page/user). The availability of
an edge is based on the presence of a user access token or app access token. User access
tokens are generated based on a combination of permissions that the user is willing to grant
regarding his/her profile and in turn allows them access to the public edges and fields of
an app or page, such as recent posts, photos, videos, and status updates. An app access
token typically is only available to the creator of the page/app or the head of a brand that
involves all of these, and gives them avenue to page insights such as the number of recent
visitors, the number of unique newsfeeds it reached, or the number of people who clicked
on, reacted to, or shared a post from the page.
Creating a Facebook Page
The procedure involved in creating a facebook page is neither complicated nor time
consuming. Steps involved are as follows:
1. From the main screen post-login, we click on the last drop down arrow and navigate
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Figure 2.1: Making our Own Page - 1
to Create Pages. Here, we select which type of page it is on a broad spectrum (Place,
Organization, Brand, etc.) out of 6 and then further, what category it falls into under
each of these, shown in figure 2.1 and figure 2.2.
2. Each of these 6 has around 25 different categories based on what the page actually
represents.
3. Now, we select a name, a profile picture, the target audience we begin advertising
to, some basic details as well as the page url.
4. Our test page MAFIAPage is now set up (figure 2.3).
As is seen, we can now post content on the page. Another interesting feature is being
6
Figure 2.2: Making our Own Page - 2
able to like other pages as MAFIAPage, and have a page-newsfeed. After setting our
preferred page audience, we can advertise it by means of artificial like inflation (covered
in detail in the next section), or using the Promote Menu on the page as in figure 2.4.
Since Facebook advertises pages from the search bar based on amixture of popularity
and relevance. It further allows the user to specify which category they would like the
results to be from (people, pages, photos, videos, groups, etc.). This is shown in figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.3: Completed Page!
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Figure 2.4: Promoting a Page
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Figure 2.5: Search Results
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3 RELATEDWORK
Facebook has never been short of unscrupulous users who saw the platform as a
means to spread malware in all its forms. From basic email spam, to taking advantage
of natural disasters, there have been several works that specifically leverage the nature of
Facebook’s organization. Twitter, with its ease of user creation and simple follow-follower
duality also suggests some insights into understanding the giveaways that exposemalicious
users.
In 2010, Facebook surpassed Google for daily user hits in the US. The same year, a
hacker named Kirllos stole 1.5 million facebook accounts and offered to sell them under-
ground at 2.5 cents each.
Facebook took it upon themselves to implement their own security measure in 2011,
called the Facebook Immune System [11]. This studies the basic threat model on Facebook
and implements a basic feature extraction system based on user behavior and common
threats to the userspace and graph system. It was primarily machine learning based built
on the idea that the facebook evasion model could be explained by adversarial learning and
uses blacklists to filter urls out from entering the graph data stream.
Gao et. al from Northwestern University did a detailed study on the spread of spam
campaigns based on these and studied 3.5 million users as well as 187 million wall posts
[5]. Note that this studywas before crawlers were required to get permission to engage with
facebook. Their algorithm was based on identifying URL similarities (with and without
11
blacklists) and the similarity in meaning of the message outside of the URL. Based on
these, they constructed user nodes that recommended the same URLs or had very similar
messages to identify spam campaigns, by filtering for bursty posting and the distributed
nature of users making these posts.
The nature of information distribution on facebook is such that distribution occurs
in a tree-like fashion with malware cascading from one user to the next based on their
friend lists, similar to the Twitter model [10] but without the anonymous-new user fac-
tor. Facebook promotes popular celebrities, but had no hashtag-based or popularity-based
follow-suggestion as it seems to have adopted now.
The idea that facebook applications could be misusing their permissions and the data
they were afforded therein was examined closely by Rahman et. al in their works on an-
alyzing socware (social-network-malware) cascades [8] and Egele et. al’s work PoX [4].
Socware is defined roughly as anything that tries to
1. compromise the user’s device
2. asks for personal information
3. promises false rewards
4. asks for posting permissions that allow it to behave independently of the user’s
knowledge
5. points to a web page that requires the user to accomplish a task that profits the owner
of the website
6. attempts to get the user to artificially inflate its reputation via free likes.
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Egele et. Al proposed a clients-side proxy for privacy awareness which would also
require the applications themselves to adopt these changes.
In [8] the authors developed an app called MyPageKeeper that focuses on all posters
of malicious content based on contextual information whether they be apps or users or
pages. This attempt focuses primarily on the idea that once authorized with a permission
(or friendship) by a user, the offending party is free to post on the user’s wall or (in some
cases) sending private inbox messages to their contacts that are now endorsed by the user
themselves. This piece of research prioritizes only the textual information on the post
combined with the like information, across all users who allowed the mypagekeeper app.
The interesting (and possibly disputable) idea with this paper is its classification of posts
pointing to an app install, as well as posts asking for likes, as objectionable content, where
they can also be viewed as purely advertising which while inconvenient, does not quite fit
the billing of ’malware’.
Their follow up work FRAppE (Facebook Rigorous Application Evaluator) shifted
its emphasis to the world of Facebook applications, which had roughly 20 million installa-
tions per day in 2012 [9]. It analyzes the posting behavior of 111k apps across 2.2 million
facebook users and determines the collusion and propagation patterns of malicious appli-
cations. Creating an app is often as simple as using a $25 toolkit, and 13% of all the apps
they analyzed were found to be malicious.
When a user adds an application, this process involves authorizing the application
to view a portion of his profile information and giving it permission to perform certain
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actions on his behalf - the granularity and scope of permissions offered has changed since
then, but the idea is still true. This authorization is established in the form of an OAuth
token, which allows the app to do so henceforth. MyPageKeeper only considers malware
at post-level granularity, and 63% of malicious posts do not have an associated applica-
tion - this leads into the work represented by FRAppE. Several of their features have a
low level of robustness - such as profile description, permissions sought, etc. and could
easily be circumvented by a more thorough attacker. Another area that could have been
improved upon was the choice WoT (Web Of Trust) as an evaluator. WoT is highly com-
munity driven and without a rigorous method of evaluation is not a reliable base to declare
benign/malicious. While Rahman et. al’s results speak for themselves (93% accuracy),
permissions have become far more granular and extremely stringent. Applications now
have to prove that every permission they ask for is absolutely necessary, otherwise it is
denied. Users can now decline to give certain permissions and apps must be capable of
functioning around these as opposed to earlier (when the app would fail). New apps are
also analyzed manually by Facebook developers before being allowed to hit the platform
and open to all users.
In 2015, Dewan et. al [3] studied one of the most prevalent and ingenious attack
methods on Facebook, which is taking advantage of its quick information dissemination
which would otherwise be invaluable during disasters or major news events. Since people
are often awaiting the latest updates on the social network of their choice, anyone pretend-
ing to be an authority could easily spreadmalware under the banner of seemingly legitimate
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information. They studied 4.4 million posts in the wake of 17 major newsmaking events
(such as disasters or terror attacks) and found that a majority of malicious content is from
third party and web applications. This work focused on identifying malicious posts in real
time with no informNation about them other than the content of the post and the accompa-
nying metadata. While this approach seems to have been successful with an 86% detection
rate it relies heavily on WoT, which is inherently biased.
Their follow-up work [2] tackles a similar problem to ours regarding the search for
malicious pages but is different insofar as it has amuch broader definition ofmalware, some
of which are not traditionally consider malware but are disapproved of by Facebook such
as hate speech, racial discrimination, political polarization, and misleading information.
This work relies on users to judge whether these pages meet the above descriptions and
WoT as a ground truth, which is unreliable and biased by users’ personal beliefs.
This was also more of a measurement study which recognized that the origin of many
malicious posts from their previous study was from a set of malicious pages, and attempted
to identify these using purely n-gram bag of words detection.
De Cristofaro et al. undertook the task of identifying how pages and campaigns
credence by artificial inflation of popularity measures such as likes [1]. Since more popular
pages show up first and are promoted more heavily, like-farming as it is known becomes a
significant threat to legitimate users attempting to popularize their campaigns. They found
that there were two major types of modi operandi - bursty, bot based liking and stealthier
behavior attempting to seem almost user-like in their liking behavior.
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Viswanath et al. [12] studied the behaviors of sybil user accounts versus normal user
accounts based on their spatio-temporal posting history and like activity. They determined
that a large number of click-spam based likes were from anomalous users based on PCA
subspace analysis.
In Twitter, two very influential works for ours were by Yang et al. on features that
characterized Twitter spammers : [14] and [13]. These papers considered the neighbor-
graph set up as well as the traditional tweet text-based features that have been seen in most
previous works. While automation is not as significant on Facebook there were certainly
a lot of inspirational ideas on these works.
Another related work on Twitter quickly realised that during times of urgency or
crisis, people are much more likely to click links without much forethought, for instance
in the wake of the tsunami in Japan [7].
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4 DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
To get our initial datasets, we start off with certain insights - easy ways to make users
like a page that can potentially distribute malware to them are based on a bait - which we
correctly guess to be one of the following: promotional facebook features (new colors/new
button/new option), a superlative information comparison (who has the best ...?/ what is
your most ...?), or download-esque clickbait. With these we manually verify our first set
of malicious actors as well as benign (based on high popularity and beyond-reasonable-
doubt) based on the content of any links/downloads/websites that are linked to. Figures
4.1 and 4.2 showcase some examples of pages distributing malicious content.
From here, we leverage the Page Friends edge to accrue a list of page IDs, and we
use this procedure exponentially to get our entire dataset.
We now use the Koala Ruby API to get all the preprocessing data as json files by
accessing the Facebook Graph Explorer. Using our custom code we calculate the feature
values, which will be detailed shortly.
Using Virustotal’s blacklists and Google SafeBrowsing as our ground truth, we ex-
amine all the links/downloadable files posted by all of these pages, and the links posted
on all the first-level links. Our rationale here is that the page-creator is responsible for
providing the link to a URL and is hence accountable for what content is found on it. We
accumulate all these zeroth and first level links and test all these urls by feeding them into
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our blacklists and testing for status.
Any page that is flagged once or more is marked as malicious, a metric that has been
seen to work well for past related studies. We then use Gephi, a free data visualization
software to consider the way the pages themselves are related and whether the page-graphs
can give us any major insights. This provides our graph based features. Next, we combine
these sets of features for each page in our benign and malicious data sets and run k-fold
cross validation on our labeled data set.
4.1 FEATURES
4.1.1 Text-Based Features
Verified Or Not:
Facebook allows Pages which are locally or globally famous to be verified or ac-
credited, which manifests itself as a tick next to the page name. The color of the tick is
determined by the scope or reach of the brand - blue indicates international, black indicates
local. This requires some form of verification by the Facebook authorities.
Average ASCII:
We measure the average number of non-ASCII characters across all posts from a
page. We notice that a lot of pages empirically are seen to have several non-ASCII char-
acters per post.
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Maximum Post Similarity:
This is not a new feature, far from it - this is an obvious feature used in many works
so far. We find it more useful to use this in tandem with average post similarity so that if
the page tries to evade the conventional metric by reducing the number of post repeats to
a small amount, the repeat is still caught.
Average Post Similarity:
A feature traditionally used in social networks - we use it in tandem with maximum
post similarity to make better inferences. If avg similarity is low and max similarity is also
low that likely indicates that a page is not trying to repeat the same message - hence not a
low effort spammer.
Average Smileys:
Another interesting feature we notice is that a lot of these pages post a large number
of smileys in their posts, with no discernible reason except to seem more amiable.
Average Unicode:
We use this to track the number of special unicode characters, which are observed to
be more in number in malicious pages.
Stat Mean:
This represents the statistical mean of the time between posts. We calculate the time
difference between every successive pair of posts and average these out, to see if the posts
are predictable in this sense.
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Stat Stddev:
Similar to the previous metric, this represents the statistial standard deviation of the
time between successive posts, also looking for predictability through a low standard dev.
Fan Loyalty:
The idea behind this metric is to identify whether the page is largely like boosted or
whether the fans are genuinely following the page. We first determine the average number
of likes per post, and divide that by the total number of likes. Our intuition here is that if
the pages are mainly campaign-promoted, there will be a comparatively small number of
likes for each individual post - showing low levels of investment compared to the number
of likes the page itself has.
Page Name Length:
In an earlier work it was discovered that a lot of malicious apps would typosquat on
a more famous app’s name which would make it easy to accidentally land on the bad app.
Pages appear similarly in the drop down, but need to remain disparate from the legitimate
page name for the same enterprise (for example, Cristiano Ronaldo Fan Page is likely
official, so it is easier to add a suffix than to replace one letter and still remain seemingly
above-board).
Non Small Letters:
Typing in many capitals or using many interesting characters catches the eye more
readily than a properly syntactical and grammatical sentence. A lot of posts frommalicious
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pages do this since every click increases the likelihood that their malware spreads.
Number of Capital Letters:
In the same vein as the above, this metric counts attempts to ’bold’ the post and
convey an artificial sense of excitement.
AvgWhitespaceChars:
Many posts by malicious pages will often attempt to inflate post length compared to
those by benign agents who are short and to the point.
Average Number of Links Per Post:
Since it makes sense intuitively to advertise more to get a product to spread faster,
to get more clicks it would logically require more exposure - so malicious pages are often
found to post urls in each post or post links to their websites exclusively.
Total Number of Links:
Related to the above, this is also an indication of how strong the promotion is. Neither
Average nor Total on their own give a clear picture, so we calculate and include both.
Common Domain Count:
This is, as far as we know, unique to our work and is based on the idea that any
campaign would primarily have an actor whose interests would be based off distributing
malware from their own website/a few websites, as opposed to random links to malicious
websites. We count the number of domains that hold at least 33% of all domains posted by
that page in all its links/urls.
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Most Common Story:
A previous work mentioned that malicious pages (though their definition of mali-
cious was much looser) seemed to favor certain certain story types, such as ”Created Story”
over others that were less easy to leverage since they did not let the page link to content of
their own.
Most Common Post Type:
The idea behind this is similar to the last one - there will likely not be a lot of casual
mobile status updates representing ’checkins’ or celebrating milestones - malicious pages
are looking to hook users into activating their content.
Number of Pages Liked:
The intuition behind this metric is to determine whether a page is attempting to con-
nect with relevant pages (from the same group, same field, etc.) or randomly maximizing
the number of pages that it could gain followers from. We suspect this metric is useful as
a correlative feature.
Likes from Other Pages:
We suspect that malicious communities are more willing to promote each other and
hence would have actively liked or shared another page’s post.
People Talking About This:
People Talking About This (PTAT) is a metric introduced by facebook that keeps a
note of how widespread a page’s reach was over a certain recent time period. It includes
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the number of likes, stories generated by shares or views, number of newsfeed posts, etc.
and is an interesting way of viewing a page’s popularity.
Likes and NewLikes:
These are a measure of the current total number of likes and the number of new
distinct users who liked a page over the past week.
4.1.2 Graph-Based Features
Eccentricity:
Eccentricity is themaximumdistance from a node to any other node it is connected to.
In essence, the largest eccentricity value becomes the diameter of the graph. We expect that
a graph with known malicious nodes will have differing values of eccentricity compared
to the unknown ones.
Closeness Centrality:
Closeness centrality is a measure of how close any node on the social graph is to all
other nodes on the graph, calculated as the sum of distances to all connected nodes.
Harmonic Closeness Centrality:
Harmonic Closeness Centrality is a variant of closeness centrality that accounts for
the fact that a lot of network graphs might be sparse and hence largely incomplete. It uses
the sum of the reciprocal of distances instead of the reciprocal of the sum, approximating
the inverse of infinite to be 0. Since our graphs are expected to not be strongly connected,
we expect there to be differences between the nature of page-friendships of a malicious
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page vs a benign page.
Betweenness Centrality:
High betweenness centrality indicates that a page is a strong ’connector’, or lies along
the shortest path between many different pairs of nodes - essentially, the strongest point of
contact.
Clustering Coefficient
Clustering coefficient is a measure of how connected a node’s neighbors are as a
fraction over the maximum possible connections that could each have. This determines
how strongly a particular group of nodes is connected to each other and whether the nodes
have several connections of their own or are united by connecting to a single node.
Eigencentrality:
Eigencentrality is similar to Pagerank. Starting all nodes with the same value (1/N),
it percolates in a feedback loop where higher value nodes are good for connection and
contribute more to the score of any particular node. Since many links are unidirectional
we think this may offer some insight.
Reciprocal Indegree, Reciprocal Outdegree and Reciprocal Degree:
A big feature of our work is understanding how the reciprocal edge graphs contribute
compared to standard edge comparison graphs. We notice a pattern between certain nodes
that tend to act purely as ’reachers’, liking pages that are popular without any reciprocation
and use these features to quantify that instinct.
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Indegree,Outdegree and Degree:
We contrast the above features with their counterpart values on the regular edge graph
for a better understanding of the ecosystem.
Indegree Ratio and Outdegree Ratio:
Based on the ratio of the reciprocal edge-graph degrees to the degrees in the normal
edge-graph.
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Figure 4.1: A Bad Page
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Figure 4.2: Another Bad Page
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5 EVALUATION AND RESULTS
5.1 Results And Insights
We use weka’s algorithm base to evaluate our data using several different algorithms,
tweaking hyperparameters as necessary. The area under the Receiver Operating Charac-
teristics (ROC) curve, which plots the true positive rate as a function of the false positive
rate, is used to determine the success of our work.
Using the randomforest algorithm, we get an AuC of 86% and an accuracy of 78%
with a false positive rate of 11%. We find that adaptive boosting gives us up to 86%
AuC with an f-measure is 0.76, and our best results are with a filtered classifier with an
AuC of 87.1%, accuracy of 80.5% at an f-measure of 0.8. Detailed examination of our
most effective features was done using several attribute selection methods and we found
that betweenness centrality, reciprocal indegree, indegree, and several other graph features
were quite prominent on the list.
These results are showcased in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2.
We also observed that most benign pages tend to act as ’reachers’ - liking a middling
number of pages and rarely being liked in return, primarily to show support (5-13).
Malicious pages primarily come in two forms - isolated pages and pages that func-
tion in group form, with multiple connections between them. The former kind functions
independently and does not add much to our discussion of trends. The latter kind almost
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Figure 5.1: Results with Adaptive Boosting
Figure 5.2: Results with Random Forest
29
always has 2 central nodes which are connected to several, while the others are all con-
nected via these - this is verified by the reciprocal indegree and outdegree features which
show some nodes with high betweenness centrality (central nodes). We also find that har-
monic closeness centrality almost entirely consists of non zero values only in the malicious
group since their networks are much better interconnected, this reduces the accessibility
distances.
Most high-value benign nodes do not follow any pages - unless these pages are of
the same verified group. They do not need to acquire followers from other pages since
their provided value is high enough. These pages often have very high indegree and zero
or very low outdegree.
Most benign nodes also have a very low eccentricity because of the way they are
structured - mostly reachers with very few central nodes, most of which do not connect
to other pages - which is closer to 0. Almost all non-zero eccentricities are for malicious
nodes.
As far as common post types go, we find that previous trends are much less useful
when dealing with actual malware - while links and photos are still the most common
types, we observe an almost even split among benign and malicious nodes. The same goes
for the common story types - added_photos and shared_story are the most common type,
but along with mobile_status_update are almost even split - which suggests that a lot of
inflammatory material (from politically charged entities or discriminatory pages in Dewan
et. al’s work) tends to skew towards not usingmobile_status_updates, which is balanced by
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the number of traditional malware pages which do use this method to throw off suspicion
(which would be incurred by continuously posting links). Table 5.1 covers the robustness
of our features.
Our ratings system is based off an idea from the Twitter paper by Yang et. al (Twit-
terevasive) and clearly demarcates three situations: low, if the feature is largely circumstan-
tial and can bemodified consciously with minimal to no effort cost,medium if modification
is harder to control or can be controlled with mentionworthy effort cost, high if changing
the feature to avoid suspicion is either out of the malware author’s hands or comes at a very
high price to them in terms of time or economically.
In table 5.2, we show the top 10 characteristics ranked by gain ratio, and in table 5.3
they are ranked by information gain.
In this vein, several points must be made. Generally, closeness centrality measuring
only the distance to all nodes would easily be remedied on twitter since there is no limit on
the number of users that another user can follow - however, the number of pages that a page
can like is restricted to 25 on Facebook, so choosing between pages comes with an inherent
opportunity cost. Hence we scale it up to medium. While post type and common story type
are not particularly robust as far as posting methodology goes, we consider them medium-
robustness because changing the posting method can potentially make it more difficult to
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Table 5.1: Feature Robustness Summary
Number Feature Robustness
1 Verified Or Not Medium
2 Average Ascii Low
3 Maximum Post Similarity Low
4 Average Post Similarity Low
5 Average Number of Smileys Low
6 Average Number of Non Ascii Unicode Character Low
7 Mean Time Between Posts Low
8 Standard Deviation of Time Between Posts Low
9 Fan Loyalty High
10 Page Name Length Medium
11 Average Non-Small Letters per Post Low
12 Average Number of Capital Letters per Post Low
13 Average Number of Links Per Post Medium
14 Total Number of Links Medium
15 Number of Commonly Referenced Domains Medium
16 Average Number Of Whitespace Chars per post Low
17 Most Common Story Medium
18 Most Common Post Type Medium
19 Number of Pages Liked Low
20 Number of Other Pages that Liked/Shared/Commented High
21 Eccentricity High
22 Closeness Centrality Medium
23 Harmonic Closeness Centrality Medium
24 Betweenness Centrality High
25 Clustering Coefficient Medium
26 Eigencentrality Medium
27 Reciprocal Indegree High
28 Reciprocal Outdegree High
29 Reciprocal Degree High
30 Indegree Medium
31 Outdegree Low
32 Degree Medium
33 People Talking About This Medium
34 Likes Low
35 New Likes This Week Low
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Table 5.2: Ranking Features By Gain Ratio
Attribute Rank Attribute Gain Ratio
1 Indegree 0.1687
2 Degree 0.1242
3 Betweenness Centrality 0.1178
4 Reciprocal Degree 0.0998
5 Reciprocal Indegree 0.0998
6 Eccentricity 0.0998
7 Reciprocal Outdegree 0.0998
8 Closeness Centrality 0.0845
9 Harmonic Closeness Centrality 0.0845
10 Outdegree 0.0834
Table 5.3: Ranking Features By Information Gain
Attribute Rank Attribute Information Gain
1 Degree 0.2378
2 Indegree 0.1505
3 Outdegree 0.1117
4 Avg Post Links 0.1047
5 Total Post Links 0.094
6 Reciprocal Outdegree 0.0376
7 Reciprocal Indegree 0.0376
8 Eccentricity 0.0376
9 Reciprocal Degree 0.0376
10 Harmonic Closeness Centrality 0.0237
propagate links. Clustering coefficient would normally be considered very high in terms
of robustness as outside of controlling an entire set of interconnected pages, it is nigh-
impossible to set up a situation where a page is connected to a set of interconnected pages
that are not sparsely linked. We drop its robustness to medium considering that a non-zero
value is almost never encountered in our data set.
As part of our comparative work, we contrast the method used by Dewan et. al with
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identifying malicious pages from their posts using n-gram bag of words models. Similar
to theirs we attempt a similar classification and our results are in Table 5.4 compared to the
n-gram classification on our dataset.
Table 5.4: Comparative Results with Hiding in Plain Sight [2]
n-gram Results k-fold cross validation(MAFIA Feature Set)
Naive Bayes 0.56 0.66
Logistic Regression 0.51 0.688
Neural Network 0.526 0.688
Random Forest 0.60 0.762
We also use Sparsenn and natural language toolkits and as we can see with a change
in training dataset to reflect traditional malware, it is much less effective to use n-grams
(n=1,2,3) to classify their posts.
We suspect this to be because unlike some of the other categories used by Dewan et
al. as undesirable pages on Facebook, several are based off the idea of engaging the users
in the form of textual posts or purely through pictures. In the absence of pages based on
displaying pornographic images or politically or racially motivated arguments or groups,
there is much less of a need for long text-based posts to make a coherent argument in any
form. Since most malicious pages are posting urls (which break sentence structure) or
promoting earlier links, this method seems to lose its efficacy. As we can see, even the
most effective neural networks methods, which provided 84% in earlier works, drop down
to 50%.
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Figure 5.3: Case Study 1 - Free Music Download Site
5.2 Case Studies
5.2.1 Case Study 1
In this example, we compare 2 pages that are a textbook example of a mini-
campaign. These two pages have similar long names (’Free Music Download Site’
and ’Free Music Download Program’), and post the same link as their reference URL
(http://bit.ly/mp3sfreez). They are shown in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4.
They also post exactly once on the same date (August 4, 2014) and have exactly
45 followers each. The page they link to offers a malicious download as confirmed by
Virustotal.
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Figure 5.4: Case Study 1 - Free Music Download Program
5.2.2 Case Study 2
This situation involves 3 pages connected in a hub manner with two pages following
the third but having no other links outward or inward. The pages have very similar names
(’WhatsAppHack - Account Spy Software’ and ’Snapchat Hack - Account Spy Software’),
and a combined audience of 3000 (for exactly 3 posts made on the same day, within hours
of each other). These are shown in figure 5.5, and figure 5.6. Interestingly, the software
offered is also remarkably similar in both cases suggesting that these are indeed made by
the same individual.
Both applications are seen to be malicious actors that install a Trojan on the user’s
machine (shown in figure 5.7 and 5.8). They also link to a third page which offers a ’Cell
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Figure 5.5: Case Study 2 - WhatsApp Hack - Account Spy Software
Phone Tracker’ application. On further pursuing this link, the user is drawn into typical
spam-socware that requests personal information and mini-survey payments before pro-
viding the offered download. These pages are presented in figure 5.9 and figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.6: Case Study 2 - Snapchat Hack - Account Spy Software
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Figure 5.7: Case Study 2 - Whatsapp Hack Software Image
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Figure 5.8: Case Study 1 - Snapchat Hack Software Image
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Figure 5.9: Case Study 2 - CellPhoneTracker Download Page
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Figure 5.10: Case Study 2 - CellPhoneTracker Socware
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Our work critically analyzes the Facebook ecosystem, definitely establishing the im-
portance of pages as a key player in the malware distribution chain. We develop a resilient
feature set that gives us a 81% accuracy rate with 87% AUC on the ROC graph.
We also study the nature of intra-page relationships on Facebook and discover a
marked denseness in malicious page networks as compared to benign page networks which
are very sparse.
Most of these pages have over 5000 likes, and several have over a million likes each
- this is a combined audience of at least 15 million people (averaging over the number of
malicious pages we find and accounting for overlap). The reach of these pages is what
makes them a significant threat - once a person has vetted a page, since they do it of their
own volition, they are unlikely to re-evaluate their decision. We examined a set of 22000
pages and our analysis presented us with 650 malicious pages - it would be a simple matter
to uncover more given that we do not account for groups or communities of people on
facebook which promote these pages, which is a similar problem which is not in the scope
of this work.
We realise that our work could be more expansive, since we examine a small number
pages (comparative to ecosystem size) as our dataset. However, several of our processes
become computationally (spatially and temporally) infeasible as the dataset increases.
We could also combine our work with those of several previous studies and study
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the impact of common users who liked malicious and benign pages, what the friendship
relations are between them, and whether malicious pages or benign pages use more like
harvesting.
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